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I. INTRODUCTION
States have implemented Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account
programs ('IOLTAs")' to generate revenue for legal aid. IOLTAs raise
money through the creation of an economy of scale by directing
attorneys to place clients' trust funds that could not profitably draw
interest in individual checking accounts into an unsegregated interestbearing bank account ("IOLTA account").2 By significantly reducing
the expense that results from opening and maintaining separate
accounts for individual clients, the IOLTA account profitably draws
interest when individual client accounts could not. 3 The interest
generated from the IOLTA account is used to fund legal aid programs
according to the specifications in the rules of the particular state's
IOLTA, while the clients' principal is returned on demand to the
attorney. Following the implementation of the original program in
Florida in 1981, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
adopted IOLTAs. 4 These programs currently raise $100 million
annually in funding for legal aid. 5
This Note examines whether a state's expropriation of the
interest generated from clients' principal in IOLTA accounts results in

1.
The acronym "IOTA" ("Interest on Trust Account") is also commonly used in some
states to refer to these programs. For consistency, this Note will use the term "IOLTA" to refer
to all such programs, regardless of the appropriate acronym for a specific state's program.
2.
Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 94 F.3d
996, 998 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted as Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 117 S. Ct.
2535, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1011 (1997).
3.
Cone v. State Barof Florida,819 F.2d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 1987).
4.
David A- Price, Legal Services' Stealth Funding,Investor's Business Daily Al (October
15, 1996).
5.
Joyce Price, Ruling May Imperil Legal Aid for Poor, Washington Times A6 (September
19, 1996) (quoting Leroy Cordova, Executive Director of the Texas IOLTA program).
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an unconstitutional taking of clients' property. 6 Part II provides the
historical and legal background of IOLTAs and discusses the often
cursory judicial dismissal of the takings issue at the state level and
the rejection of takings claims by both the First7 and Eleventh s circuits. It then analyzes the Fifth Circuit's unprecedented holding in
Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation,9 the first case at any level to hold that clients possess a
property interest in IOLTA funds. Part III examines whether clients
have a constitutionally-recognizable property interest in IOLTA revenue. Particular attention is given to the claim that the inability of
clients to benefit economically from IOLTA-generated interest precludes the finding of a property right in IOLTA funds. Part IV discusses whether, given the fact that clients do possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue, the government'so expropriation of IOLTA
6.
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. Const., Amend. V. In addition to bringing takings claims,
clients have often alleged that IOLTAs violate their first amendment right to free speech by
compelling them, through the programs' funding of legal aid programs, to support political
speech with which they disagree. See notes 56 and 64 for two such cases. Although a discussion
of the constitutionality of IOLTAs under the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Note,
the threshold issue under both free speech and takings challenges is the same: Whether clients
possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue. Since most courts have held that clients lack a
property interest in IOLTA income, jurists typically have not had cause to determine whether
the programs would violate the first amendment rights of clients if the state did expropriate
clients' property under IOLTAs.
See, for example, Washington Legal Foundation v.
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 980 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that
Massachusetts's IOLTA did not violate the claimants' first amendment rights since IOLTA
income "belongs to no one"). But see Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 1004 (holding that since
clients possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue, Texas's IOLTA violated the claimants' first
amendment rights if the clients did not consent to the confiscation). Because of the highly
political nature of many of the causes supported by IOLTA-funded legal aid programs, if clients
are found to possess a property interest in program revenue, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
IOLTAs violate the first amendment rights of clients is likely correct. See Keller v. State Bar of
California,496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (holding that the State Bar's compulsory use of attorneys' funds
to finance ideological activities such as endorsing a nuclear weapons freeze initiative violated
attorneys' first amendment rights). See also Price, Investor's Business Daily at Al (cited in note
4) (documenting some controversial advocacy engaged in by legal aid lawyers, including an
attempt to stop welfare reform in several states).
7.
MassachusettsBar Foundation,993 F.2d at 962.
8.
Cone, 819 F.2d at 1002.
9.
94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted as Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
117 S. Ct. 2535, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1011 (1997).
10. With a few narrow and irrelevant exceptions, the Constitution only protects individual
rights against government action. Thomas E. Baker and Robert E. Wood, Jr., 'Taking"A
ConstitutionalLook at the State Bar of Texas Proposalto Collect Interest on Attorney-Client Trust
Accounts, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 327, 337 (1983). Courts that have adjudicated the constitutionality of IOLTAs have given no indication that the programs do not involve state action. Because of
the state's underlying role in establishing IOLTAs, the programs almost certainly will not be able
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proceeds amounts to an unconstitutional taking of clients' property.
Part V analyzes the constitutional rationale for invalidating IOLTAs
in the face of claims that the abrogation of these programs would have
dire consequences for the provision of adequate legal services to the
indigent. Part VI summarizes why IOLTAs result in an unconstitutional taking of clients' property.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Implementation of IOLTAs
Although other countries have used similar programs since the
1960s, 11 the development of IOLTAs in the United States was only
made possible by the passage of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ('DIDMCA").12 The
Act authorized the creation of negotiable order of withdrawal ("NOW')
accounts, which operate as interest-bearing checking accounts. 13 The
Act allows individuals, certain charitable non-profit organizations,
14
and public entities to use these accounts.
Attorneys hold clients' funds in trust under a variety of
circumstances, including situations in which money is required for
filing fees, real estate closing costs, or personal injury settlement
drafts. 1 Prior to the passage of DIDMCA, attorneys held trust money
in non-interest bearing accounts, giving banks interest-free use of the

to avoid constitutional scrutiny on the ground that no state action is present. Furthermore, in
the majority of states in which attorney participation in IOLTAs is mandated, state action seems
incontestable. For a discussion of the state action issues relating to IOLTAs, see id. at 337-39.
11. Several British Commonwealth countries have successfully raised money for legal aid
through IOLTA-type programs since the 1960s. Kenneth Paul Kreider, Note, Floridab IOLTA
Program Does Not 'Take" Client Property For Public Use: Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 57 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 369, 369 (1988).
12. 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1989).
13.
Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 998.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2).
15. Paul Marcotte, Big Interest in Small Change,ABA Journal 70, 71 (July 1, 1987).
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funds. 16 The legalization of NOW accounts allowed attorneys to hold
eligible clients' funds in interest-bearing checking accounts. 17
Not all NOW-eligible clients are able to draw interest profitably, however, since the administrative expense of opening and maintaining individual NOW accounts for some clients will exceed the
interest accruing to these accounts. 8 The developers of IOLTAs recognized that attorneys did not place the trust funds of these clients
into individual interest-bearing accounts, but instead placed the funds
into a non-interest bearing pooled account held in the lawyer's name. 9
These developers wanted to shift the benefit of the implicit interest
generated from such pooled accounts from depository institutions to
legal aid organizations.20

By state supreme court decree, in 1981 Florida became the first
state to implement an IOLTA.21 Other states soon followed Florida's
16. Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 998. These trust funds could not be placed in interestbearing savings accounts because attorney ethics rules demanded that they be immediately
available, id., and federal law prohibited banks from paying interest on demand accounts.
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, S. Rep. No. 96-368, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C-AN. 236, 240. See MassachusettsBar Foundation, 993
F.2d at 968 (noting the ethical requirement that attorneys make clients' trust funds immediately
available for reimbursement).
17. Lawyers have generally been recognized as being under an ethical obligation to place
clients' trust funds that can profitably draw interest into interest-bearing accounts. Matter of
Indiana State Bar Association's Petition to Authorize a ProgramGoverning Interest on Lawyers'
Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. 1990) (quoting In the Matter of Interest in Trust
Accounts, 402 So.2d 389, 399 (Fla. 1981) (Boyd, J., dissenting)). In addition, the American Code
of Professional Responsibility has been interpreted as barring lawyers from charging clients for
costs incurred in holding clients' funds. Peter M. Siegel, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account
Programs: Do They 'Take" 'Troperty" of the Client?, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 674, 679 & n.14 (1984).
Thus, attorneys are required to bear the costs associated with maintaining NOW accounts for
their clients. Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 998. See note 127 for a discussion of how placing
the costs of NOW accounts on attorneys might create a property interest in the accounts by
clients.
18. Expenses include the costs of establishing and maintaining an account, service charges,
accounting costs, and tax reporting costs. Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 999 (quoting Texas
Rules of Court-State, Rules Governing the Operation of the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Program rule 6 (West 1996)).
19. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d at 968. For a discussion of the potentially
improper benefits attorneys sometimes receive for giving banks interest-free use of clients'
money, see Rachael Scovill Worthington, Note, IOTA-Overcoming Its Current Obstacles, 18
Stetson L. Rev. 415, 428-30 (1989).
20. Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 998.
21. Kreider, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 369 (cited in note 11). The successful implementation of
IOLTAs was predicated on the promulgation of an I.R.S. ruling that exempted IOLTA revenue
from the taxable income of clients. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16. Because of concern over
setting a precedent for tax-avoidance schemes regarding the assignment of income, whereby
taxpayers could shift their income to other entities in whose control the income either would not
be taxed or would be taxed at a lower rate, the I.R.S. issued Ruling 81-209, which provided that
clients would not be taxed on the interest earned in IOLTA accounts so long as they had no
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lead, and currently forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
utilize IOLTAs to raise money for legal aid.22 A few states have
adopted their IOLTA through legislative action, but most states, like
23
Florida, have authorized their program via judicial decision.
IOLTA provisions typically require attorneys participating in
the program 24 to make a good faith judgment regarding whether their
clients' funds are so nominal in amount or will be held for such a short
period of time that the money will be unable to draw interest
profitably in an individual interest-bearing account. 25 If a participating attorney decides that this condition is met, she is required to place
the client's funds into an IOLTA-designated unsegregated interestbearing NOW account. 26 By eliminating the expense associated with
opening and maintaining an individual NOW account for each client,
an IOLTA account is able to draw interest profitably when accounts
held individually for IOLTA-eligible clients could not.27 A designated
non-profit organization, often the state bar association, receives the
interest generated from the IOLTA account2 and allocates it among
29
chosen forms of legal aid.

choice whether to participate in the program. Matter of Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d
389, 390-91 (Fla. 1981). The I.R.S. had no reservations in approving attorney-voluntary IOLTAs
so long as client control was entirely removed. Kreider, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 377 (cited in note
11). To prevent the anomalous situation of clients being taxed on income in which they purportedly did not have a property interest, IOLTA provisions give clients no control over whether their
principal will be placed in an IOLTA account. See note 129 for an extended discussion of this
anomaly.
22. Price, Investor's Business Daily at A2 (cited in note 4). Indiana is the only state not to
have implemented an IOLTA. Id. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text for an explanation of

the Indiana decision.
23.

Price, Investor's Business Daily at A2 (cited in note 4).

24. Attorney participation is mandatory in 27 states. Id. "Opt out" programs, in which
attorneys must participate unless they successfully petition to be exempted, exist in 19 states.
Id. Three states have voluntary programs. Id. To raise more money for legal aid, many states
have increased the level of compulsory attorney participation. Worthington, 18 Stetson L. Rev.
at 421-24 (cited in note 19). Because of the reluctance of many attorneys to place clients' funds
into IOLTA accounts, states that have mandated attorney participation have seen a significant
increase in IOLTA revenue. See Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 999 (noting Texas's IOLTA
yielded $10 million annually under a mandatory program in the early 1990s, as compared to one
million dollars under a voluntary program in 1988).
25. See, for example, Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 999 (quoting Tex. Gov't Code Ann. tit.
2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 11 § 5 (West Supp. 1995)) (describing the Texas IOLTA's requirement
that attorneys place into an IOLTA account clients' funds that "are nominal in amount or are
reasonably anticipated to be held for a short period of time").
26. Id.
27. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006.
28. Making non-profit organizations the sole recipients of the interest generated from
clients' principal enables the IOLTA to use a NOW account without violating DIDMCA restrictions on NOW eligibility. Id.
29. In New Jersey, for example, Legal Services receives 75% of IOLTA money, the New
Jersey State Bar Foundation receives 12.5%, and various grants account for the remaining
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Since the amount of IOLTA-eligible funds is highly sensitive to
changes in interest rates, IOLTAs are an inherently unstable source of
revenue. 30 Nevertheless, the programs comprise a very important
source of funding for legal aid. After federal funding, IOLTAs currently constitute the second largest source of funding for groups that
provide legal services to the poor, 31 generating about $100 million
nationally in annual revenue. 2 IOLTAs' financial support of legal aid
has been rendered even more consequential as the result of Congress's
recent funding cuts for legal services, 3 and legal aid supporters warn
of the severe consequences that would result from the invalidation of
4
JOLTAs.3

B. JudicialTreatment of the Takings Issue
1. State Courts
Most states that have judicially adopted IOLTAs have implemented their programs without a published opinion. 35 In those states
in which IOLTAs have been implemented or upheld in published

12.5%. Dana Coleman, IOLTA Funding: Trouble Looming, New Jersey Lawyer 1, 14 (Sept. 23,
1996).
30. See Janet Elliot and Robert Elder, Jr., Fifth Circuit Casts Doubt on IOLTA, Texas
Lawyer 1, 18 (September 23, 1996) (noting that declining interest rates contributed to a decrease
in the annual revenue generated by Texas's mandatory IOLTA from $10 million in the early
1990s to five million dollars in 1996).
31. Id.
32. Price, Washington Times at A6 (cited in note 5) (quoting Leroy Cordova, Executive
Director of the Texas IOLTA program). By comparison, federal funding for legal services in fiscal
1996 was $278 million. Price, Investor's Business Daily at Al (cited in note 4).
33. The 104th Congress cut the funding of Legal Services Corp., the federally-established
organization that distributes legal aid outlays, by 30% for fiscal 1996. Id. These cuts have
resulted in severe hardship for legal aid groups. See Attorneys Do Battle Over LSC Cuts, The
Lawyer 5 (September 3, 1996) (noting speculation that federal cuts would result in one-third of
Legal Services' attorneys being laid off and at least one-fourth of the organization's law offices
being closed). Moreover, the 104th Congress placed additional restrictions on the manner in
which federally-appropriated legal aid funds could be used, precluding Legal Services' attorneys
from, among other things, filing class actions suits or representing prisoners. William Booth,
Attacked as Left-Leaning, Legal Services Suffers Deep Cuts, Washington Post Al, A6 (June 1,
1996).
34. See Coleman, New Jersey Lawyer at 15 (cited in note 29) (noting comment of New
Jersey President of Legal Services that the consequences of a Supreme Court holding that
IOLTAs were unconstitutional "would be devastating to Legal Services").
35. Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 1001 n.30.
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judicial opinions, 6 courts have typically given cursory treatment to the
37
constitutional issues posed by the programs.
With one exception, state courts analyzing the constitutionality
of IOLTAs have uniformly rejected the argument that the programs
result in an unconstitutional taking of clients' property on the ground
that clients do not have a property interest in IOLTA income. 38 These
courts have found that a property right does not exist in IOLTA revenue since such revenue has no net value to clients as a result of the
fact that IOLTA provisions only mandate the surrender of trust funds
39
that are unable to draw interest profitably in individual accounts.
Courts have emphasized that, prior to the implementation of IOLTAs,
the interest presently generated by these programs was unavailable to
cients.40 Some courts have further noted that IOLTAs simply result
in a shift of earnings from depository institutions to legal aid
beneficiaries, since previously, banks had been given what amounted
to an interest-free
loan of trust funds that could not profitably draw
interest. 41
Indiana is the lone state that has failed to adopt an IOLTA. In
Matter of Indiana State Bar Association's Petition to Authorize a
Program Governing Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 42 the Indiana
Supreme Court refused to implement a program as the result of both
constitutional and ethical concerns. While not directly addressing the
issue of whether IOLTAs constituted an unconstitutional taking, the
court indicated that IOLTAs violated the long-established legal maxim
that the owner of property is the owner of the income that his property

36. The state courts that have analyzed IOLTAs in published opinions include Carroll v.
State Bar, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193 (1985); Petition by MassachusettsBar Association, 478 N.E.2d
715 (Mass. 1985); Matter of Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 675 S.W.2d 355 (Ark. 1984);
Matterof Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983) (per curiam); Petition of
Minnesota State Bar Association, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982); Petition of New HampshireBar
Association, 453 A.2d 1258 (N.H. 1982) (per curiam); Matter of Interest on Trust Accounts, 402
So.2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
37. See Petition of Minnesota State Bar Association, 332 N.W.2d at 158 (concluding without
explanation that clients do not possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue).
38. See Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 1001 & n.30 (collecting cases).
39. See Matter of Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d at 395 (stating that "no client is
compelled to part with 'property' by reason of a state directive, since the program creates income
where there had been none before, and the income thus created would never benefit the client
under any set of circumstances"). ,
40. See Petition of New HampshireBar Association, 453 A.2d at 1261 (noting that IOLTAs
create a source of income that would not otherwise exist).
41. See Petition by MassachusettsBar Association, 478 N.E.2d at 718 (quoting Matter of
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 675 S.W.2d at 357) (emphasizing that prior to the implementation of IOLTAs, the use of IOLTA-eligible principal "simply rebound[ed] to the benefit of
the depository institution").
42. 550 N.E.2d 311 (Ind.1990) (per curiam).
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produces. 43 The court also disputed the argument that IOLTAs simply
amount to a shift in windfall profits from depository institutions to
legal aid beneficiaries. 44 The court asserted that, since banks typically
furnish non-interest bearing accounts at no charge to attorneys,
depository institutions' use of funds in non-interest bearing accounts
represents the implied payment for services rendered. 45 Accordingly,
the court concluded that depository institutions receive no unjust
enrichment under these circumstances.46
The Indiana Supreme Court's concerns regarding IOLTAs have
not been shared by other state courts, however. Focusing on the ability of IOLTAs to create income when no income existed before, the
state judiciaries throughout the rest of the nation have implemented
IOLTAs, with little constitutional critique, to raise revenue for legal
aid programs believed by judges to be in need of increased funding.
2. Federal Courts
a.
Rejection of the Takings Argument by the First and
Eleventh Circuits
Florida's IOLTA was the first program to be challenged in
federal court. In Cone v. State Bar of Florida,47 the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed a client's takings claim against Florida's voluntary IOLTA
program on the ground that the interest earned on the client's portion
of the IOLTA account was not the client's property. 48
The Cone court stated that to possess a constitutionally-protected property interest, a claimant must show a 'legitimate claim of

43. Id. at 311-12.
44. Id. at 314.
45. Id. (quoting Thomas K. Milligan, IOLTA-another view, Res Gestae 194, 194 (Oct.
1983)).
46. Id. The court also recognized problems regarding the depositor eligibility requirements
of IOLTAs that pose serious constitutional problems. The court asserted that trust funds that
could not profitably draw interest in individual NOW accounts, and thus be eligible for deposit in
an IOLTA account under the usual definition of IOLTA eligibility, could often profitably draw
interest for clients in collective accounts through the process of subaccounting. Id. See Part
III.C for a more extensive analysis of subaccounting.
47. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 1007. See note 24 for a discussion of voluntary, as opposed to mandatory,
participation in IOLTA accounts.
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entitlement" to the property based on substantive law.4 9 The court
found that the plaintiff lacked this entitlement to IOLTA income
because such income lacks net value to clients. 50 The court found that
this lack of net value rendered inapplicable the common law rule that
the owner of principal is the owner of the interest generated by such
principal. 51 The court did not cite any Supreme Court precedent for its
assertion that net value was a prerequisite for possessing a property
52
interest.
The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that her property interest was established by I.R.S. Ruling 81-209, 53 which held that clients
would not be taxed on IOLTA income only if they had no choice but to
participate in the program. 54 The court reasoned that the "assignment
of income" doctrine on which the I.R.S. ruling was based was designed
not to determine the identity of the legal owner of property, 55but to
assure that people were being properly taxed on earned income.
The First Circuit, in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Massachusetts Bar Foundation,5s rejected a takings claim brought by
In
clients against Massachusetts' mandatory IOLTA program.
that
conceding
although
plaintiffs,
the
MassachusettsBar Foundation,
they did not possess a property interest in IOLTA proceeds, made the
related claim that they possessed a protected property interest in
controlling and excluding others from the beneficial use of their principal. 57 The First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the ground
that, while several Supreme Court cases had established the existence
of a constitutionally-protected right to exclude others from real prop-

49. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Although Roth was a procedural due process case, its definition of what constitutes a constitutionally-cognizable property interest has been cited in takings cases as well. See Webb's
Fabulous Pharmaciesv. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Roth as authority for the
law regarding property in a takings case).
50. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007. The court accepted the district court's conclusion that no
feasible banking procedures existed that would allow the client's principal to draw interest
profitably in a pooled collective account held in her attorney's name. Id. at 1006. See Part llI.C.
for an exploration of how a client might successfully collect interest from a pooled account.
51. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. See Part Ill.A-1 for a discussion of the common law rule
regarding principal and interest.
52. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006-07.
53. Id. at 1007 n.8. See notes 21, 129 and accompanying text for further discussion of the

IRS ruling.
54. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
55. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 n.8.
56. 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993). Both clients and attorneys also alleged that the program
violated their first amendment right of free speech. As noted earlier, the free speech issue is
beyond the scope of this Note. See note 6 for a brief discussion of the free speech issue.
57. Id. at 974.
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erty, no precedent supported the existence of a similar constitutional
58
right to exclude others from intangible property.
In dicta, the Massachusetts Bar Foundation court analyzed
whether, if the clients could establish a property interest in the beneficial use of their principal, the program resulted in an unconstitutional taking.59 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
government's action amounted to a per se taking, noting that categorical takings had only been found in cases involving physical invasions of real property, not in cases involving interference with intangible property rights6
Consequently, the First Circuit indicated it
would resolve the takings issue under the ad hoc standards
enunciated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.61
The court stated that, as the result of the IOLTA funds' lack of net
value to clients, Massachusetts's program did not have an adverse
economic impact on the claimants and did not interfere with the
claimants' investment-based expectations.
Therefore the court
62
concluded that no taking had occurred under the Penn Centraltest.
b. Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation: A Bold Break from Precedent
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation63 gravely threatened the
continued operation of IOLTAs within its jurisdiction. In Texas Equal
Access, clients alleged that Texas's mandatory IOLTA resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of their property.6
The three judge panel
unanimously vacated the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claim and held that clients possessed a property interest in IOLTA
58. Id. at 974 & n.2. Justice Breyer was a member of the three judge panel that unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Massachusetts's IOLTA in MassachusettsBar Foundation,
a fact which may of some significance when the constitutionality of IOLTAs is litigated before the
Supreme Court. Id. at 968.
59. Id. at 974.
60. Id. at 975. See Part IVA for a discussion of per se takings.
61. Id. at 974 (citing Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)). The Court in Penn Central analyzed the following factors to determine whether a taking
had occured: (1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with the distinct investment-based expectations of the claimant, and (3) the character of
the government action. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
62. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d at 976. See notes 158-60 and accompanying
text for a closer examination of IOLTAs under the Penn Central test.
63. 94 F.3d at 996.
64. The suit also alleged that Texas's program amounted to a violation of both clients' and
attorneys' first amendment rights. Id. at A99.
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revenue.65 The court remanded the case and indicated that to prevail
on the takings claim, the clients would simply have to show that they
did not consent to Texas's expropriation of their IOLTA-generated
66
interest.
The court began its analysis by noting that state law defines
property under the United States Constitution and that Texas follows
the traditional rule that the interest earned from principal belongs to
the owner of the principal.67 The court asserted that the IOLTA
proceeds' lack of net value to clients did not vitiate this long-held rule,
citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.68 for the
proposition that the value of expropriated property does not affect the
determination of whether a property interest exists in such property.6 9
The court rejected the defendants' contention that Loretto was
inapplicable in the IOLTA context because IOLTAs concern the confis70
cation of money rather than real property.
The Fifth Circuit noted flaws in the reasoning of past courts
that had upheld the constitutionality of IOLTAs. The court asserted
that since depository institutions typically pay interest first and then
deduct fees, the focus of the Cone court on the lack of net value of
IOLTA revenue to clients was inapposite. 7 1 The court reasoned that a
property interest attaches the moment that interest accrues and that
the banks subsequent deduction of fees has no cleansing effect on this
7 2
initial attachment.
The Fifth Circuit also discussed the peculiarity made apparent
by the I.R.S. ruling preventing clients from being taxed on IOLTA
revenue only if they are given no control over whether their principal
is placed in an IOLTA account. 73 The court explained that if a state
created an IOLTA program in which clients were given a choice regarding which charitable beneficiary received their principal, a highly
anomalous situation would arise because clients could be taxed on
income in which they purportedly did not have a property interest.74

65. Id. at 1005.
66. Id. at 1004. The court indicated that the plaintiffs would have to meet a similar standard to prevail on the first amendment claim. Id. See note 6 for more discussion of the potential
first amendment claim.
67. Id. at 1000. See Part IIIA.1 for further exploration of this principle.
68. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
69. Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 1002 n.38 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1003. See text accompanying notes 49-52 for a discussion of the Cone court's
reasoning.
72. Texas Equal Access, 94 F.2d at 1003.
73. Id. See notes 21, 129 for more discussion on the IRS Ruling.
74. Id.
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The court further expressed the practical fear that holding that clients
lacked a property interest in IOLTA proceeds could set a precedent for
government agencies to take advantage of similar loopholes in banking regulations in order to expropriate unclaimed interest for pro75
grams in need of funding.
The Fifth Circuit gave less attention to the question of
whether, given its finding that clients possessed a property interest in
IOLTA income, the Texas program resulted in an unconstitutional
taking. The court did not explicitly address the question of whether
the IOLTA's confiscation of clients' property constituted a per se
taking or instead should be analyzed under the multi-factor Penn
Central takings test. The court's application of the per se takings rule,
however, was made clear by its direction on remand to the district
court that the plaintiffs would prevail on the takings claim simply by7 a6
showing that "the taking was against the will of the property owner."
III. CLIENTS POSSESS A PROPERTY INTEREST IN IOLTA REVENUE
Prior to Texas Equal Access, two federal courts and every state
court but one that had discussed the issue had held that clients did
not possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue. Consequently,
most courts have not needed to decide the issue of whether the confiscation of clients' property under IOLTAs amounts to an unconstitutional taking. Notwithstanding the prevailing judicial view, however,
courts that have upheld the constitutionality of these programs have
incorrectly resolved the determinative issue by holding that clients do
not have a property interest in IOLTA revenue.

75. Id. at 1003-04.
76. Id. at 1004. See text accompanying notes 161-63 and Part IV.B.2 for more explanation
of the significance of client consent. In the Fifth Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc, the
dissent took issue with several aspects of the panel's opinion. The dissent made the familiar
argument that claimants must economically benefit from property in which a constitutionally
protected interest is claimed. Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation, 106 F.3d 640, 642-44 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (Benavides, J., dissenting). More
specifically, the dissent asserted that the panel overlooked the distinction between "accrued
interest" and "interest proceeds" and contended that Webb's FabulousPharmaciessuggested that
a property interest only exists in the latter. Id. at 642-43. Moreover, the dissent stated that, as

the result of the IOLTA funds' lack of net value to clients, the Texas Equal Access plaintiffs
possessed no compensable claim for "just compensation," and thus had no remedy against the
program. Id. at 644. See Part IV.B.3 for an extended discussion of appropriate compensation.
Finally, the dissent criticized the panel for not explicitly stating which takings standard it was

applying, the per se rule or the Penn Central ad hoc test, and asserted that the panel's opinion
left open the question of which criterion the district court should apply on remand. Id. at 645.
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A. State Law Defines Property under the FederalConstitution
The Supreme Court has not attempted to give a uniform definition of what constitutes property under the United States
Constitution. 77 Instead, in both takings 78 and due process 79 cases, the
Court has emphasized that property interests are defined by an independent source such as state law. The Court has stated that a claimant must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to property for it to
be protected under the Constitution and that a claimant's "unilateral
expectation" in property will not be constitutionally recognized.80
Some courts have seized upon this language when rejecting the
existence of a property interest in IOLTA proceeds, 81 even though the
language seemingly only reaffirms the Court's position that a
constitutionally valid property interest must be based on an inde-

82
pendent legal source.

1. Common Law Rule that Interest Follows Principal
The traditional rule, deeply established in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, is that an owner of property owns the income that the property produces.8 3 At common law, the right to receive income from real
property was ownership, and this concept was readily transferable
into the personal property arena84 Courts continue to apply the timehonored principle that interest follows principal when defining what
constitutes property under state law.85

77. At least one commentator has argued that the Constitution, not state law, should define property. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments to
the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation"Law,80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
78. In its adjudication of a takings claim, the Webb's Court stated that "[p]roperty interests... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law. .. ." Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161 (alterations in original) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
79. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
80. Id.
81. See note 86.
82. See Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 713 (cited in note 17) (stating that "[a]n entitlement
exists if the fund owner can identify substantive law that supports his assertion of a property
interest"). But see Baker and Wood, Jr., 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at 359 (cited in note 10) (arguing
that a second tier of property analysis exists under the Constitution in which a court must decide
"whether the state-created interest rises to the level of federally-protected property").
83. Matterof IndianaState Bar, 550 N.E.2d at 312.
84. Baker and Wood, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at 357 (cited in note 10). Justice Johnson noted
this equitable principle in 1809 in his statement that "interest goes with the principal, as the
fruit with the tree? Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 319 (1809) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
85. See Blumberg v. Pinellas County, 836 F. Supp. 839, 844-45 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
that claimants had a property right in the interest generated from their principal because "under
common law, the ownership of interest follows the ownership of principal").
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Courts upholding the constitutionality of IOLTAs have shown

no inclination to modify this traditional rule. Instead courts have
simply concluded that clients do not possess a property interest in
IOLTA proceeds because such proceeds lack net value to clients. In
finding an exception to the customary rule, some courts have
presumed that a 'legitimate claim of entitlement" cannot exist in
funds that have no net value to claimants.8 6 These courts, however,
have improperly used the Supreme Court's language regarding the
need for a legitimate claim of entitlement to enunciate an independent
constitutional definition of property in which net value is a
prerequisite to recognition, when in fact the Court's statements simply
reiterate its consistently-held position that property interests must
arise from an independent legal source such as state law.87
Accordingly, a proper analysis of the constitutionality of IOLTAs
begins with the recognition that under state law, the income produced
by principal becomes the property of the owner of the principal.
2. Webb's Fabulous Pharmaciesv. Beckwith: The State May Not, by
Ipse Dixit, Redefine Traditional Concepts of Property Rights
In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith,m the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a statute that expropriated
interest that had accrued from a state-held fund composed of
privately-owned principal amounted to an unconstitutional taking.
The case arose when a prospective buyer of the assets of Webb's
Pharmacies backed out of the purchase at closing after learning that
Webb's had a substantial debt that had not been revealed. 89 The
buyer filed a complaint of interpleader in Florida state court and

86. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004 (finding that no property interest existed in IOLTA funds
since the client could not show a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to interest that had no net
value to her). Instead of analyzing whether the client possessed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" by examining whether any substantive law supported her claim, the Cone court improperly used the Supreme Court's language in Roth as the basis for its presupposition that constitutionally-protected property rights must have some economic value to the claimant. Id. at 1007.
See also Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 693-96 (cited in note 17) (arguing that clients do not possess
a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to IOLTA revenue because such revenue lacks net value to

clients).
87. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161 (defining property interests by state law).
88.

449 U.S. 155 (1980).

89.

Id. at 156.
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surrendered the $1.8 million purchase price to the clerk of the court90
A state statute required that principal deposited in the registry of a
county court be placed in an interest-bearing account and provided
that the interest accruing from that account belonged to the state. 91
Subsequently, a receiver appointed for Webb's demanded that the
court tender the interpleaded funds.92 The court surrendered the $1.8
million principal in the account, minus a statutorily-mandated deduction for administrative fees, but pursuant to the statute withheld the
$100,000 in interest that had accrued. 9
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the state's expropriation of the interest generated from the interpleader fund
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the Webb's creditors' property. 94 The Court began by noting that property interests under the
Constitution are defined by an independent source such as state law95
The Court asserted that Florida followed the rule that principal deposited in the registry of a court is private, not public, property.9 The
Court then noted the general rule that the interest accruing from
principal belongs to the owner of the principal97 While recognizing
that the Florida court could constitutionally exact a payment proportionate to the expenses that resulted from holding the principal in the
interpleader fund, 98 the Webb's Court emphasized that the state could
not violate the traditional rule that interest follows principal simply
by recharacterizing the claimants' principal as "public money. 99
Therefore, the Court held that, because the Florida statute, by "ipse
dixit,"1 ° transformed the ownership of the interest accruing in the
interpleader fund from the owners of the principal to the government,
the state's action amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the creditors' property. 10 1

90. Id. at 156-57. An interpleader is "[ain equitable proceeding to determine the rights of
rival claimants to property held by a third person having no interest therein." Black's Law
Dictionary 817 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
91. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 155-56 & n.1.
92. Id. at 158.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 164-65.
95. Id. at 161.
96. Id. at 160.
97. Id. at 162.
98. Id. at 163.
99. Id. at 164.

100. Black's Law Dictionary defines "ipse dixit" as "[hie himself said it; a bare assertion
resting on the authority of an individual." Black's Law Dictionary 828 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
101. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.
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3. Application of Webb's to IOLTAs
Although Webb's involved the state's expropriation of $100,000
in interest rather than the state's retention of interest that had no net
value to clients, the holding remains relevant to the IOLTA takings
controversy. The Court reaffirmed that state law defines property
under the Constitution and that, under state law, the interest
10 2
produced by principal belongs to the owner of the principal.
Furthermore, the Court's holding that the rule that interest follows
principal cannot be vitiated by a statutory recharacterization of
interest as state property '0 3 makes clear that IOLTA proceeds are not
exempt from the customary rule that interest follows principal simply
because IOLTA provisions designate a non-profit organization, rather
than clients, as the legal owner of the interest generated from the
IOLTA account.
A favored argument of IOLTA proponents is that the programs
do not amount to a taking since they create the possibility of net interest when none was available before. 1°4 The Webb's Court's conclusion that the creditors were the rightful owners of the interest generated from the interpleader fund, however, was not altered by the
inability of the creditors' principal to draw interest prior to the passage of the statute that gave ownership of the interest to the state.
Webb's indicates that the fact that the government has enabled principal to accrue interest when none was available before does not give
the government the right to claim such interest as its own.105
Therefore, while the state is not constitutionally required to authorize
the right to earn interest, once it does so, it is bound by traditional
concepts of property ownership. As a result, the fact that IOLTAeligible principal was unable to profitably draw interest for clients
prior to the implementation of IOLTAs does not exempt the programs'
revenue from the common law rule that interest follows principal.

102. Id. at 161-62.

103. One scholar has criticized as incongruous the fact that prior-in-time state law definitions of property are accorded constitutional protection but subsequent state recharacterizations
of property rights are not granted similar protection. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understandingof the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 164142 (1988). While this insight does reveal a logical tension in takings jurisprudence, the Court's
position apparently reflects an attempt to reconcile the Justices' commitment that federalist
principles govern constitutional conceptions of property with their desire that the Takings
Clause protect preexisting understandings of property rights.
104. See Matterof Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d at 395 (making this argument).
105. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162.
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B. Clients' State-Recognized PropertyInterest Is Not Vitiated by Their
Inability to Economically Benefit from IOLTA Income
The Webb's Court indicated that state law defines property
under the Constitution, that interest follows principal under state law,
and that, even if claimants' property was unavailable prior to governmental intervention, the state may not, by fiat, transform such
private property into public property.' °6 Absent differentiation from
the IOLTA context, Webb's demonstrates that clients are the owners of
the interest earned from their principal in IOLTA accounts under the
customary rule that interest follows principal. Courts, however, have
distinguished Webb's from the IOLTA property interest issue on the
ground that, in contrast to the inability of clients to personally benefit
from IOLTA revenue, the claimants in Webb's had an expectation of a
net return of interest. 10 7 These courts have properly noted that Webb's
does not address the question of whether a claimant can have a
property interest in funds that have no net value to him. Thus, other
precedent must resolve the issue of whether the Takings Clause
precludes the state from retaining interest that cannot economically
benefit a claimant.
1. Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp.: The Existence of a Property
Interest Does Not Depend on the Value of the Property
Being Confiscated
The Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.0 8 examined whether the existence of a constitutionallyrecognized property interest depends upon the size or value of the
property in which an interest is claimed. In Loretto, a New York statute required landlords to allow cable television companies to install
cable facilities upon their property in return for a one-time payment to
the landlord of one dollar. 0 9 Pursuant to the statute, a cable television company installed two small boxes along cables on the roof of an
apartment building that the Loretto plaintiff had recently purchased. 110

106. Id.
107. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 (finding Webb's inapplicable in the IOLTA context since
Webb's concerned the retention of interest that possessed value to the claimants).
108. 458 U.S. at 419.
109. Id. at 423-24.
110. Id. at 421-22.
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The Loretto Court held that the company's action pursuant to
the statute resulted in a taking of the claimant's property."' The
Court began its analysis by noting that physical invasions short of an
occupation or regulations that simply restrict the use of property are
subject to the Penn Central balancing test." 2 The Court emphasized,
however, that it had consistently held that "permanent physical occupation" of property amounts to a per se taking."5
Neither the possibility that the physical occupation increased
the total value of the claimant's property 4 nor the fact that the government only authorized the possession of a small area of the claimant's property altered the Court's holding. 1 5 The Court stated that
property interests had traditionally been described as the rights to
possess, use, and dispose of property, and emphasized that permanent
6
physical occupations of property completely destroy such rights."
The Court noted that, in conjunction with the inability to possess
property, the property owner loses the right to exclude others, which
the Court described as "one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights." 1 7
Accordingly, the Court
concluded that constitutional protections for the rights of private
property do not depend upon the size of the area permanently
8
occupied."
2. Application of Loretto to IOLTAs
Although the Texas Equal Access court relied on Loretto in
finding that clients have a property interest in IOLTA funds,"9 most
other courts have overlooked the applicability of the case to the IOLTA
property interest issue. 2 0 Despite the judicial disregard of Loretto, the
111. Id. at 441. The Court did not adjudicate the issue of what compensation should be paid
to the landlord for the taking. Id.
112. Id. at 426.
113. Id. at 432.
114. Id. at 437 n.15.
115. Id. at 436-37.
116. Id. at 435.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 436-37.
119. Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 1002 n.38.
120. See, for example, Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006-07 (ignoring Loretto in its analysis of whether
clients possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue). In MassachusettsBar Foundation,one of
the few IOLTA cases in which Loretto has been analyzed, the court was able to differentiate the
case from the IOLTA context because of the form in which the plaintiffs claim was brought.
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d at 975. Since the Massachusetts Bar Foundation
plaintiffs did not argue that they possessed a property interest in IOLTA income, but only argued
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case contradicts the contention of IOLTA proponents that clients do
not possess a property interest in IOLTA proceeds. As discussed by
the Texas Equal Access court, Loretto made clear that the value of
property to claimants does not affect the determination of whether a
constitutionally recognizable property interest exists in such
121
property.
Courts that have upheld the constitutionality of IOLTAs have
concluded that no property interest exists in IOLTA income because
such income has no economic value to clients. 122 While courts have
typically reached this conclusion with little or no analysis, and no
reliance on Supreme Court precedent, 123 their deduction is seemingly
based, either explicitly or implicitly, on the assumption that a valid
property interest must economically benefit a claimant in some man4
ner. 12
This view of property, however, contradicts the reasoning of the
Loretto Court, which emphasized that the private ownership of property is grounded on the rights of the property owner to possess, use,
and dispose of his property. 125 The minimal size and value of the expropriated property played no role in the Loretto Court's determination of whether a constitutionally-protected property interest existed
in such property. 126 In the case of IOLTAs, while the diversion of
IOLTA income to state-designated beneficiaries does not economically
harm clients, the state's action does deprive clients of the ability to
exercise the bundle of property rights described in Loretto with respect
to IOLTA-generated interest. 127 In particular, IOLTAs preclude cli-

that they had an intangible property right to exclude others from the interest generated from
their principal in IOLTAs, the court found Loretto inapplicable because it concerned a tangible
property interest. Id. at 974.
121. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
122. See notes 38-41, 49-52 and accompanying text.
123. See MassachusettsBar Foundation,992 F.2d at 976 (citing one case for the proposition
that IOLTAs do not concern a client's economic rights).
124. See Matter of Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d at 395 (operating under such an assumption).
125. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
126. Id. at 436-37 & n.15.
127. See Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 1002 (noting that under Cone, "'property' is
[erroneously] redefined as an interest that must necessarily benefit its owner") (alteration in
original) (quoting Mary O'Byrne Sinibaldi, Note, The Taking Issue in California'sLegal Services
Trust Account Program, 12 Hastings Const. L. Q. 463, 492 (1985)). Sinibaldi also argues that as
the result of the ethical prohibition against attorneys charging clients for trust fund expenses,
IOLTA income could benefit clients. Sinibaldi, 12 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 491-93. Even though
IOLTA-eligible principal is unable to draw net interest in individual NOW accounts, such principal can always profitably draw interest for clients, since clients will receive the accrued interest
because attorneys must absorb the NOW account expenses under Bar ethics rules. Id. at 491-92.
Sinibaldi acknowledged that in situations in which the costs of maintaining NOW accounts

1997]

IOLTAs UNMASKED

1317

ents from excluding others from the use of the interest accruing from
their principal, disregarding the Loretto Court's admonition that the
right to exclude is one of the most important rights inherent in the
private ownership of property12s Thus, Loretto reveals that the inability of clients to benefit from IOLTA revenue does not minimize the
constitutional protection afforded to clients' ownership rights as
vested under the common law rule that interest follows principal. 129
Moreover, by its recognition under the facts of the case that the
occupation may have increased the total value of the claimant's property, the Loretto Court revealed that a property interest in occupied
property is not vitiated even if the government's permanent invasion
of the property economically benefits the claimant.130 In contrast, the

exceed the possible benefits, the placement of clients' funds into individual NOW accounts makes
no economic sense. Id. at 491. Consequently, in the absence of an IOLTA, an attorney would
likely place such funds into a non-interest bearing account. See text accompanying note 19 for a
description of how attorneys placed such funds into non-interest bearing accounts prior to the
implementation of IOLTAs. In contrast to Sinibaldi's argument, one commentator has contended
that IOLTA-eligible clients could not benefit from individual NOW accounts as the result of the
customary trust rule that trustees are entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred in
administering a trust. Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 720 (cited in note 17). Under a customary
trust agreement, in which the trustee is reimbursed for administrative expenses, a client could
not benefit from the opening of an individual NOW account since bank fees would exceed accrued
interest. Siegel did not explain, however, how the inability of a typical beneficiary to benefit
from the maintenance of a trust account, when administrative costs exceed interest, abrogates a
client's ability to benefit from the establishment of an interest-bearing account under these
circumstances as a result of the ethical prohibition against attorneys receiving expense reimbursement.
128. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
129. The Texas Equal Access court discussed the anomaly with respect to I.R.S. Ruling 81209 (cited in note 21), which resulted from the finding of past courts that clients must benefit
from property in which an interest is claimed. The possibility mentioned by the Fifth Circuit
that, as the result of the I.R.S. ruling, clients could under some circumstances be taxed on
IOLTA-generated interest, does not prove that clients have a property right in such interest.
Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 1003. As the Cone court noted, the ruling did not represent an attempt to define property, but instead was issued to prevent taxpayers from reducing their tax liability by shifting their income into a revocable trust in which the income would be taxed at a
lower rate or would not be taxed at all. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 n.8.
Nevertheless, while this potentially incongruous situation does not prove that clients have a
property interest in IOLTA funds, it does expose the tension between traditional notions of
property law and the reasoning of courts that have found clients to lack a property interest in
IOLTA revenue. The I.R.S. ruling by its terms is an exception to the general scheme whereby
the owner of principal is responsible for paying any taxes on interest generated from her
principal. Thus, in the hypothetical situation in which IOLTA-generated interest is not taxexempt as the result of clients' control over their principal, the illogic of the government's
taxation of IOLTA revenue in which the clients purportedly do not have a property interest
results from the discord between the Tax Code's recognition of the rule that interest follows
principal and the disregard of this common law principle by courts that have rejected the existence of a property right in IOLTA income.
130. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437 n.15.
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government's expropriation of IOLTA revenue does not increase the
total value of clients' property; rather, by simply leaving clients with
their underlying principal, IOLTAs have no effect on the total value of
clients' property. 1 1 If, as indicated by Loretto, the constitutional protections granted to seized property are not minimized by the economic
benefit accruing to a claimant as the result of the government's occupation, a fortiori, the lack of economic harm resulting to clients from
the state's expropriation of IOLTA revenue cannot invalidate the
constitutional recognition of the clients' underlying property right in
the interest generated from their principal.
Loretto cannot be distinguished from the IOLTA context on the
ground that the case involved the confiscation of real property rather
than money. The foundational underpinning of Loretto was the fact
that, under state law, the claimant was the legitimate owner of the
property that the state permanently occupied. 13 2 The Court's traditional reliance on state law in defining property rights under the
Constitution and its concomitant refusal to impose its own definition
of property 133 ensured that the Loretto claimant's state-established
property interest would be accorded constitutional recognition by the
Court.
Similarly, as the result of the common law rule that the interest generated from principal belongs to the owner of the principal,
clients whose funds are deposited in an IOLTA account are the owners
of IOLTA-generated interest under state law. The rule that interest
follows principal is not confined to situations in which interest possesses a requisite value to the owner of the principal, 3 4 just as the
Loretto claimant's state-recognized ownership in the seized property
was not limited by any state rule that restricted fee simple ownership
to property possessing a certain net value. The bundle of state-

131. As the result of the inability of IOLTA-eligible principal to earn net interest in individual accounts, the underlying principal in the IOLTA account represents the highest value that
clients' trust funds could attain in the absence of IOLTA intervention.
132. See id. at 427 n.5 (quoting Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1184 (cited in note 77))
(stating that "[tihe one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems
to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large,
'regularly' use, or 'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership").
133. See, for example, Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161 (stating that property interests "are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law") (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). See Part IIIA for a discussion of the Supreme Court's definition of property.
134. See Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 1002 (holding that the rule that interest follows

principal is not vitiated by the inability of the owner of the principal to benefit economically from
the accrued interest).
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protected property rights described by the Loretto Court relates with
equal force to all forms of property. 135 A property owner has a similar
interest in exercising the state-secured rights to possess, use, and
dispose of property regardless of the form that the property takes,
whether it is chattels, real estate, or accrued interest. Thus, the
Loretto Court's holding that a state-recognized ownership interest in
confiscated property is not eliminated as the result of such property's
minimal value to claimants applies with equal force
to the IOLTA
property interest issue.
C. Potentialof Sub-Accounting
Courts have rejected the existence of a property interest in
IOLTA revenue on the ground that clients are unable to benefit from
such revenue. Even assuming the general validity of the faulty premise that one must be able to benefit economically from property for
such property to receive constitutional protection, these courts have
overlooked an alternative method by which IOLTA-eligible principal
could accrue net interest for clients. The possibility that depository
institutions could establish profitable sub-accounts for individual
clients within a pooled interest-bearing account potentially
undermines the assumption that all IOLTA-eligible funds have no net
16
value to clients. 3

135. The applicability of the Loretto Court's definition of property to forms of property other
than real estate was revealed by the Court's adjudication of a takings claim in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). In its determination that a constitutionally cognizable
property right existed in trade secrets, the Court stated:
That intangible property rights protected by state law are deserving of the protection of
the Taking Clause has long been implicit in the thinking of this Court: "It is conceivable
that [the term 'property' in the Taking Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical
sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized
by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase
has been the latter."
Id. at 1003 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. GeneralMotors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
377-78 (1945)).
136. The Texas Equal Access court argued that another banking practice, depository
institutions' payment of interest before their deduction of fees, undermined the contention that
clients lack a property interest in IOLTA revenue. See text accompanying notes 71-72 for an
explanation of the court's argument. The Fifth Circuit's argument presupposes that an irrevocable property interest is created the moment interest accrues, an unsupported though logical
assumption. According to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, this sequence renders irrelevant the
issue of whether clients can benefit from their interest, as the bank's subsequent deduction of
fees does not nullify the clients' previously attached property interest. The Texas Equal Access
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Under federal regulations, a lawyer can place trust funds of
individual clients who are eligible to use NOW accounts into a collective interest-bearing account held in the attorney's name and distribute accrued interest proportionately to each client upon remittance of
their principal. 137 By reducing the costs associated with opening and
maintaining an individual account for each client, sub-accounting may
be able to reduce the expense per client of using a NOW account, and
thus, increase the number of clients whose principal can profitably
accrue interest. 138 Nevertheless, wide disagreement exists among
commentators and jurists regarding the ability of depository institutions to create profitable sub-accounts using clients' trust funds that
are unable to draw net interest in individual accounts. 139 Some courts
have asserted that the administrative costs of holding such funds
within a pooled account would far exceed accrued interest, 140 while
others have maintained that present technology would enable banks

court's contention is bolstered by an examination of the theoretical uncertainty that would result
from a contrary finding. A holding that, despite the accrual of interest prior to the deduction of
bank fees, clients do not have a property right in the interest generated from their principal
when fees exceed accrued interest begs the question of how much time must pass between the accrual of interest and the deduction of fees before a property right attaches to the interest.
Presumably, at some point, the time gap between the interest accrual and the fee deduction
would grow so large that a property interest would adhere in the interim. Notwithstanding the
fact that in practice this gap may be short, the argument that a property interest does not
immediately attach to interest upon its accrual lacks a principled basis for determining how
much time must pass before a property interest is established in accrued interest.
One can properly find fault in the Texas Equal Access court's argument. Under the Fifth
Circuit's position, the existence of a property interest depends upon a procedural sequence that
makes little practical difference to depositors. A constitutional scheme that allows a client to
realize a property right in accrued interest simply by transferring funds from a depository
institution that charges fees first to an institution that pays interest first seems arbitrary at
best. This capriciousness results from the Fifth Circuit's attempt to discredit Cone. In making
this technical argument, the Texas Equal Access court assumed the validity of the Cone court's
definition of property, under which net value is a prerequisite to recognition. In contrast to the
bright-line, long-held rule that interest follows principal, a constitutional framework that bases
the existence of a property right on the ambiguoui standard of whether a claimant can benefit
from property invariably will result in unprincipledldistinctions being made, as evidenced by the
Fifth Circuit's insight regarding the sequence of banking procedures.
137. Matter of Indiana State Bar, 550 N.E.2d at 314 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 204.130(b), (e)
(1996)).
138. See Marcotte, ABA Journal at 73-74 (cited in note 15) (discussing the availability of
sub-accounting among depository institutions).
139. This issue is complicated not only by the differing abilities of depository institutions to
sub-account at low cost to depositors but also by the floating rate of interest paid on NOW
accounts.
140. See, for example, MassachusettsBar Foundation,993 F.3d at 973 n.9 (noting acknowledgment by both parties that no feasible procedure existed that would allow law firms to pool
funds in a collective account that could profitably draw interest); Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006 n.6
(noting that the costs of opening a sub-account at a local bank would be 30 times the accrued
interest on the claimant's principal in a sub-account).
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to create profitable sub-accounts for virtually all funds presently
4
deposited in IOLTAs.' '
IOLTA rules typically provide that attorneys must place clients' trust funds into an IOLTA account when such funds are nominal
in amount or are going to be held for a short period of time. 42 These
eligibility provisions are grounded on the assumption that these funds
would not be able to draw net interest in individual accounts, but the
rules make no exception for funds that could draw net interest in a
pooled account held in the attorney's name. 4 3 Thus, notwithstanding
the statements of past courts that IOLTA revenue has no net value to
clients, to the extent that clients' trust funds that are unable to draw
net interest in an individual NOW account could draw net interest in
a pooled NOW account through the process of sub-accounting, IOLTA
provisions mandate the surrender of principal that could economically
benefit clients.'"
D. Summary
In contrast to the prevailing judicial view, clients possess a
property interest in IOLTA revenue. Past Supreme Court cases have
consistently held that an independent legal source such as state law
determines property interests. The common-sense rule that the owner
of principal is the owner of the interest generated by that principal is

141. See, for example, Matter of Indiana State Bar, 550 N.E.2d at 314 (characterizing subaccounting technology as "simple and inexpensive"); Price, Investor's Business Daily at Al (cited

in note 4) (reporting opinion of trusts scholar that clients could profitably draw interest on NOWeligible funds through the use of sub-accounting).
142. See text accompanying notes 24-26.
143. For example, Texas's IOLTA requires that an attorney consider the ability of a client's
principal to draw positive interest "without regard to funds of other clients which may be held by
the attorney...." Texas Rules of Court-State, Rules Governing the Operation of the Equal
Access to Justice Program rule 6 (West 1997).

144. Admittedly, difficulties would arise from any attempt to further limit IOLTA eligibility
to principal that could not benefit clients in a pooled account. For example, the ability of a
client's principal to draw interest through sub-kcounting would hinge on whether the depository
institution that the client's attorney used offered this service. Furthermore, even if the attorney's bank offered sub-accounting, the ability of the principal to accrue interest profitably would

depend on the amount of funds held in the attorney's collective account at any particular time.
These problems illustrate the difficulty of designing workable IOLTA-eligibility provisions that

comport with the programs' underlying premise that clients do not possess a property interest in
IOLTA revenue as the result of their inability to benefit from such revenue under any circumstances. Moreover, the troublesome issues posed by sub-accounting reveal the haphazardness

that results from the application of this premise, under which, for example, the existence of a client's property interest in IOLTA income may hinge on whether the client's attorney uses a bank
that offers a sub-accounting service.
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deeply established in common law tradition. Unless properly distinguished from the instant controversy, this rule governs the ownership
of IOLTA revenue.
The Webb's Court established that a state may not vitiate the
rule that interest follows principal simply by recharacterizing interest
proceeds as belonging to the state. 14 5 The Court also rejected the
"taking what it had created" argument of the state that Florida could
render this common law rule irrelevant by authorizing the accrual of
interest when none was available before and then retaining the statu4
torily-authorized interest in state coffers.1 6
Loretto repudiates the contention that IOLTA income is exempted from the interest follows principal rule as the result of such
income's lack of net value to clients. The Loretto Court established
that the existence of a constitutionally-recognizable property interest
does not hinge on the ability of a claimant to benefit economically from
property, but instead rests on the ability of a claimant to exercise the
bundle of rights to possess, use, and dispose of property as protected
under state law. 47
Furthermore, no proper basis exists for
distinguishing Loretto on the ground that the case concerned the expropriation of real estate rather than money. Therefore, Loretto compels a finding that clients have a property interest in IOLTA funds
under the state law rule that interest follows principal.
IV. THE EXPROPRIATION OF CLIENTS' INTEREST UNDER IOLTAS
CONSTITUTES ATAKING
Once a client has shown a property interest in IOLTA proceeds,
the focus shifts to the issue of whether the state's expropriation of
clients' property under IOLTAs constitutes a taking. An examination
of relevant precedent reveals that, absent client consent, IOLTAs
result in an unconstitutional taking.
A. Introductionto Takings Jurisprudence
Government interference with private property does not automatically result in a taking. Instead, Supreme Court jurisprudence
has divided government interference with property rights into two
categories. First, state action that either results in a permanent
145. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.
146. Id. at 162.
147. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
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physical occupation of a claimant's property or deprives a claimant's
property of all economic or productive value constitutes a per se
taking. 148 Second, government regulation that falls short of a
permanent physical occupation and does not deprive property of all
value is considered under the factual standards enunciated in Penn
Central.49 Thus, the threshold inquiry in every takings case is
whether the state action falls into the per se takings category or into
the Penn Central category in which the constitutionality of government regulation is determined by ad hoc, easily manipulable standards.
An exception to the takings construct exists if the interference
with property results from the government's legitimate use of its
police power.'rO The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council'51 indicated, however, that this justification constitutes a very
narrow exception to general takings jurisprudence. 52 In contrast to
the statements of past courts, 53 the Lucas Court held that the police
power justification can legitimize state action that otherwise amounts
to a taking only if the contested state action does not extend the restrictions already placed on property by the state's property and
nuisance laws. 15

148. Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
149. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432. In Penn Central, the Court indicated that the following
criteria were particularly significant in the ad hoc determination of whether government
regulation constitutes a taking: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with the distinct investment-based expectations of
the claimant, and (3) the character of the government action. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
150. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-23.
151. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
152. Id. at 1027-29.
153. Prior to Lucas, the police power justification encompassed state regulation that prevented "harmful or noxious uses" of property. Id. at 1022. As the Lucas Court noted, however,
the distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and regulation that "confers
benefit" was difficult to resolve on an objective basis. Id. at 1026. This situation gave judges
almost unfettered discretion to uphold favored interferences with property under the police
power justification. See id.
154. Id. at 1029. Thus, a valid exercise of the police power must not do more than duplicate
the result that could have been achieved in the courts through the enforcement of a preexisting
public or private right of action. Id.
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B. Application of Takings Jurisprudenceto IOLTAs
1. IOLTAs Amount to a Per Se Taking
Since most courts have upheld the constitutionality of IOLTAs
on the ground that clients lack a property interest in IOLTA income,
few jurists have had cause to analyze whether the expropriation of
clients' property under IOLTAs amounts to a taking.
In
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, one of the few cases in which the
takings issue has been discussed, the First Circuit, after rejecting the
clients' claim that they possessed an intangible property right to
exclude others from the use of IOLTA-generated interest, stated in
dicta that even if clients did possess this intangible property interest,
Massachusetts's program did not amount to a taking. 5 5 The First
Circuit differentiated its holding from Webb's on the ground that,
while Webb's involved the invasion of tangible property, the
Massachusetts Bar Foundation claimants conceded that they did not
possess a tangible property interest in IOLTA proceeds. 156 Finding the
per se takings rule to be inapplicable to interferences with intangible
property rights, the First Circuit analyzed Massachusetts's IOLTA
under the multi-factor Penn Central test and concluded that the
57
program did not constitute a taking.
If analyzed under the ad hoc Penn Central standard, the First
Circuit's conclusion that IOLTAs do not amount to a taking appears to
be correct. 5 8 All three Penn Central factors weigh in favor of a finding
that IOLTAs do not amount to a taking. 59 First, IOLTAs have little, if
any, economic impact on clients since the expropriated interest cannot
benefit clients in individual NOW accounts and, at best, can benefit
clients only marginally in pooled sub-accounts. For similar reasons,
the programs do not interfere to any significant degree with the
investment-based expectations of clients. Finally, the character of the
state's action can properly be viewed as a non-intrusive attempt to

155. Massachusetts Bar Foundation,993 F.2d at 974; see notes 56-62 and accompanying
text for a more extensive analysis of the MassachusettsBar Foundationdecision.
156. MassachusettsBar Foundation,993 F.2d at 975-76.
157. Id. at 974-76.
158. See Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 744-53 (cited in note 17) (arguing that IOLTAs do not
constitute a taking under the multi-factor balancing test). But see Sinibaldi, 12 Hastings Const.
L. Q. at 507-10 (cited in note 127) (suggesting that California's IOLTA constitutes a taking under
the Penn Central test).
159. See note 149 for the three Penn Central factors.
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adjust "the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the public

good.")160

As the Fifth Circuit held, however, the Penn Central balancing
test is not relevant to the determination of whether IOLTAs constitute
a taking. In Texas Equal Access, the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly
address the issue of whether the state's retention of clients' property
under Texas's IOLTA constituted a per se taking.1 1 The Fifth
Circuit's implicit finding that the state's action amounted to a categorical taking was made clear, however, by its instruction on remand
that the district court should find a taking if the plaintiffs could show
that the state's confiscation of IOLTA-generated interest occured
against the will of the clients. 162 Thus, the Texas Equal Access court
made the analytical jump from holding that clients possessed a property interest in IOLTA income to concluding, without any intervening
analysis, that, absent client consent, Texas's IOLTA resulted in a
taking. The Texas Equal Access court's conclusion apparently resulted
from its presumption that the Supreme Court's finding of a per se
taking in both Webb's and Loretto, two cases the Fifth Circuit relied
upon heavily in holding that clients possessed a property interest in
IOLTA revenue, 63 similarly compelled a finding that the confiscation
of clients' property under IOLTAs amounted to a per se taking.
While the Fifth Circuit's adjudication of the constitutionality of
Texas's IOLTA would have been clearer if the court had discussed the
takings issue separately instead of ending its analysis upon finding
that clients possessed a property interest in IOLTA revenue,' 64 the
court's conclusion that IOLTAs result in a per se taking is correct.
The Loretto Court made clear that the applicability of the per se takings rule to permanent physical occupations is not vitiated by the
invaded property's lack of value to claimants.65 Thus, Loretto reveals
that the inability of clients to benefit economically from IOLTA revenue cannot liberate these programs from the categorical rule that
permanent physical invasions constitute a taking.66
160. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
161. See Part II.B.2.b for a discussion of the Texas Equal Access holding.
162. Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 1004.
163. Id. at 1000-02.
164. See note 76 for Judge Benavides's criticism of the court's failure to specify which test it
was using.
165. See Part III.B.1 for an extended analysis of Loretto.
166. Courts upholding the constitutionality of IOLTAs have given no indication that, if
clients do possess a property interest in program revenue, the per se rule would be inapplicable
to the IOLTA takings issue as the result of a de minimis standard. In fact, the Cone court stated:
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Although some disagreement exists regarding the applicability
of the per se takings rule to the state's confiscation of money rather
than real estate, 167 Webb's indicates that this categorical rule extends
to the expropriation of personal property such as deposited interest
proceeds. While the Webb's Court never used the phrase "per se
taking" or similar language in finding that Florida's confiscation of the
claimants' interest proceeds constituted a taking, the Court's rhetoric
made clear that it was applying the categorical rule.
For example, the Webb's Court emphasized that Florida's action did not simply increase the burdens on the claimants' property,
but instead amounted to a "forced contribution" to the government
unrelated to the costs of using the courts. 168 Furthermore, the Court
stated that Florida's action was analogous to the state's action in
United States v. Causby,169 a case in which the Court found that the
government's utilization of air space above the claimant's land as part
of a flight plan for military aircraft amounted to an unconstitutional
taking. 170 The Webb's Court subsequently included a quotation from
Penn Central that differentiated the government's use of the claimant's property in Causby from regulation that simply reduces the
value of a claimant's property.'7 ' This treatment of Causby revealed
the Webb's Court's position that Florida's confiscation of the claimants'

[W]e emphasize that we are not establishing a de minimis standard for Fifth Amendment
takings, or due process violations. We do not wish to imply that the state may constitutionally appropriate property so long as the property is very small property. Here, there
was no taking of any property of the plaintiff.
Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 (citations omitted).
167. The Takings Clause does not, of course, prevent the government from compelling
people to surrender their money under the taxing power. While a complete discussion of the
relationship between taxings and takings is beyond the scope of this Note, a fundamental
difference between the two actions is that a tax exacts contributions based upon a "uniform rule
of apportionment," while a taking compels a limited group of property owners to surrender more
than their "proportionate share of the public burden." Baker and Wood, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at
350 (cited in note 10). Although in practice the distinction between a taxing and a taking is not
always clear, little attempt has been made to justify IOLTAs as a valid exercise of the state's
taxing power. Id. at 349. If this argument is made, IOLTAs's targeting of legal clients to directly
subsidize legal aid programs will weigh against a finding that the programs simply amount to a
tax. See Part V for a description of how IOLTAs burden a limited group of people with financing
a public program. Moreover, in the states in which IOLTAs have been implemented via judicial
action, the characterization of the programs as a taxing may be precluded by separation of
powers principles.
168. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163.
169. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
170. Id. at 265.
171. The Webb's Court stated that "Causby emphasized that [the] Government had not
'merely destroyed property [but was] using a part of it for the flight of its planes.'" Webb's, 449
U.S. at 164 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128 (alteration in original) (quoting Causby, 328
U.S. at 262 n.7)).
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interest proceeds, like the government's appropriation of the
claimant's real estate in Causby, should not be adjudicated under the
ad hoc standards of Penn Central.172 Most importantly, the Webb's
Court's failure to enunciate or analyze the factors in the Penn Central
17
test indicates that the Court was applying the per se takings rule.
Despite the Court's rhetoric, the language in Webb's indicating
that Florida could have retained the claimants' interest to the extent
that the expropriation was reasonably related to the costs of using the
courts has been interpreted to mean that the Court did not find the
175
state's action to be a per se taking.7 4 United States v. Sperry Corp.,
however, indicated that the enforcement of a reasonable user fee is
conceptually different from a taking, and hence this language in
Webb's should not be viewed as evidence that the Webb's Court applied
the Penn Centralbalancing test. 76 In Sperry, the Court held that the
deduction of a statutory fee from the claimant's compensation
awarded by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal did not constitute
a taking because, in contrast to the state's disproportionate exaction
in Webb's, the fee was reasonably related to the cost of setting up the
Tribunal. 77 The Sperry Court emphasized that a reasonable user fee
does not constitute a taking if it is imposed for the purpose of reimbursing the government for services provided to a claimant."78 Thus,

172. The Loretto Court similarly cited Causby as an example of a case in which the ad hoc
standards of Penn Central were inapposite as the result of the permanent physical occupation of
the Causby claimant's property. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430-31.
173. See Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc., 449 U.S. at 163-64.
174. See Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 746 (cited in note 17). Siegel contended that the
Webb's Court's acknowledgement that the state could retain the claimants' interest, to the extent
the exaction constitution a fee for services rendered, revealed that the Court was not applying
the per se takings rule. Id.
175. 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
176. Id. at 62.
177. Id. at 60, 62 & n.8.
178. Id. at 60-63. Some litigants have seized upon a footnote in Sperry to argue that the per
se rule does not govern the state's expropriation of money. The footnote reads in relevant part:
It is artificial to view deductions of a percentage of a monetary award as physical appropriations of property. Unlike real or personal property, money is fungible.... If the deduction in this case were a physical occupation requiring just compensation, so would be
any fee for services, including a filing fee that must be paid in advance. Such a rule
would be an extravagant extension of Loretto.
Id. at 62 n.9. This footnote should be analyzed in light of the Sperry Court's holding that the
government's action was constitutional because the fee amounted to reasonable compensation for
services rendered and should not be viewed as contradicting the rule of Webb's that the expropriation of money constitutes a categorical taking. The contrary interpretation that some
litigants proffer not only overlooks the statement's status as dicta, but also ignores the context in
which the statement was written. Moreover, this argument rests on the implausible supposition
that, without a word of disapproval of Webb's, the Sperry Court sought to invalidate the standard
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Sperry does not contradict the Webb's Court's holding that Florida's
expropriation of the claimants' interest proceeds amounted to a per se
taking; instead, Sperry merely confirms that the exaction of a reason17
able user fee does not fall within the ambit of takings law.
Therefore, Webb's reveals that the per se takings rule is the
proper standard to apply to the state's expropriation of claimants'
interest proceeds. 180 The applicability of Webb's to the IOLTA takings
issue is not lessened by the minimal value of IOLTA income to clients,
since Loretto reaffirmed that all permanent physical occupations of
property constitute a per se taking, regardless of the size or value of
the invaded property. Furthermore, like the state's confiscation of the
claimants' interest in Webb's, the state's retention of IOLTA income
cannot be justified as a user fee reasonably related to the expenses of
holding clients' principal, since the only reason the principal is being
held in an IOLTA account is to extract a profit for the state. Finally,
the narrow police power exception to the Takings Clause does not
apply to IOLTAs as the result of the lack of any underlying basis for
the state's action under state property or nuisance law. Accordingly,
IOLTAs, absent client consent, constitute an unconstitutional taking
of clients' property.
2. No Client Consent to Programs
In order for a taking to be found, a claimant must show that
she was compelled to submit to the government's interference with her
property. 18' Since no court prior to Texas Equal Access had held that
IOLTAs amounted to a taking absent client consent, jurists have had

under which that case was decided. See Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d. at 1002 n.38 (rejecting
relevance of Sperry statement to IOLTA takings issue). But see Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d
1269, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (interpreting footnote to mean that "money ... is not subject to the
per se doctrine because it is fungible").
179. The Court's holding in Dolan v. City of Tigard,512 U.S. 374 (1994), illustrates the similarity between the Supreme Court's treatment of real property and money. In Dolan, the Court
held that the government could compel the claimant to dedicate land in return for approval of the
claimant's application to expand her store and pave her parking lot only if the dedication was
"roughly proportional" in nature to the proposed development. Id. at 391.
180. Many jurists have shared this view that Webb's established the per se takings rule as
the proper standard to apply to the state's expropriation of money. See, for example, text
accompanying notes 161-62; Texas Equal Access, 106 F.3d at 645 (Benavides, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that Webb's was "clearly a per se takings case"). See Blumberg, 836 F. Supp. at
845-46 (citing Webb's application of the categorical rule to invalidate the state's retention of
claimaint's interest proceeds). But see Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 746 (cited in note 17) (arguing
that separating interest from principal is not a per se taking).
181. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992). The Yee Court emphasized that the
element of "required acquiescence is at the heart of the concept of occupation." Id. (quoting FCC
v. FloridaPower Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987)).
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no reason to analyze the issue of whether client consent is present in
182
these programs.
Clients are compelled to participate in IOLTAs under standard
program guidelines. 183 In response to I.R.S. Ruling 81-209, IOLTAs
have given clients no control over whether their principal will be
deposited in the IOLTA account once they have deposited trust funds
with an attorney.'84 This aspect of the program, by itself, compels
clients to acquiesce in the state's expropriation of their property, as
clients will only be able to avoid the confiscation of their interest by
limiting their search for legal help to attorneys who choose not to
participate in IOLTAs.
Client participation in IOLTAs is further coerced in states that
mandate attorney participation, since regardless of which attorney a
client hires, the client's trust money will be deposited in the IOLTA
account. 85 Even within the minority of states that do not mandate
attorney participation, client consent is practically limited by the
usual lack of any requirement that attorneys notify clients of their
participation in the program.8 6 Therefore, the only realistic way a
client typically can prevent the government from taking her property
is to refrain from dealing with attorneys in a manner that would require the surrender of trust funds, an option that hardly seems adequate to cure the compulsion inherent in IOLTAs.
3. Proper Remedy for Taking
Some observers have suggested that clients do not have a remedy against IOLTAs because the Constitution only prohibits takings
that occur without "just compensation.' ' 187 According to this reasoning,
IOLTAs do not constitute a compensable taking because the programs

182. In Texas EqualAccess, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case on the issue of whether the
clients consented to the taking of their property. Texas EqualAccess, 94 F.3d at 1004.
183. See Baker and Wood, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at 367 (cited in note 10) (asserting that
"client consent apparently is not a real solution to the taking issue ... because of the tax
problem").
184. See notes 21, 129 for a further discussion of the IRS Ruling.
185. See Texas Equal Access, 106 F.3d at 645 (Benavides, J., dissenting) (implying, by his
acknowledgement that Texas's IOLTA is "almost certainly unconstitutional," that if the per se
takings rule is applied, then no client consent is present in the mandatory program).
186. See Matterof Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d at 407 (stating that it was
unnecessary for attorneys participating in Utah's voluntary IOLTA to notify clients that their
trust funds were being placed in the IOLTA account).
187. Texas Equal Access, 106 F.3d at 644 (Benavides, J., dissenting); Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L.
Rev. at 751-53 (cited in note 17).

1330

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1297

render clients no worse off since they only take interest previously
unavailable to clients. 188 This argument reveals a misunderstanding
of what constitutes "just compensation." The constitutional mandate
to pay "just compensation" has been interpreted to mean that the
government must reimburse the property owner for the value of the
taken property. 189 Therefore, the relevant issue is not whether the
total value of clients' trust funds has decreased as the result of the
imposition of IOLTAs. Under this standard, Florida's confiscation of
the claimants' interest proceeds in Webb's would not have constituted
a compensable taking, since the interest-expropriating statute, by only
taking what it had created, did not decrease the value of the
claimants' money held by the county court. Rather, the state must
compensate claimants for the value of the property taken, which in the
instant situation equals the total amount of IOLTA revenue. 19
Plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of IOLTAs have
typically sought both restitution for the value of past interest taken
and an injunction against future application of the programs. 91 In
Texas Equal Access, the Fifth Circuit held that the Eleventh
Amendment, which shields states from suits in federal court without
their consent, barred the clients' restitutionary claim. 92 Whether a
court rejecting the constitutionality of IOLTAs issues an injunction or
orders restitution matters little, however, as IOLTAs will be rendered
19
inoperable regardless of which type of relief is granted.

188. Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 751-52 (cited in note 17).
189. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1946) (stating that the Takings Clause's
"justcompensation" language requires that "[tihe owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken"). Siegel cited precedent for the
contention that in the determination of what compensation is due, the government is entitled to
subtract the benefit accruing to the property owner as the result of state action from the value of
the property taken. Siegel, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 752 n.390 (cited in note 17). He emphasized
that when the loss from a taking does not exceed the benefit, compensating the owner "would be
to grant him a special bounty." Id. at 752 (quoting United States v. Sponenbarger,308 U.S. 256,
266-67 (1939)). Siegers "special bounty" argument is inapposite under the facts of IOLTAs,
however, because, while the state receives the value of clients' interest proceeds under the
programs, IOLTAs do not in any way increase the value of the clients' non-expropriated property,
their principal.
190. Baker and Wood, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at 366 (cited in note 10).
191. See Texas EqualAccess, 994 F.3d at 999.
192. Id. at 1005.
193. See Baker and Wood, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at 366 (cited in note 10) (stating that "[iut is
easy to see that the just compensation requirement, if applicable because [Texas's IOLTA] is a
taking, makes the program unfeasible").
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V. ABROGATION OF IOLTAS PROMOTES CENTRAL PURPOSE OF
TAKINGS CLAUSE

IOLTA supporters have questioned the propriety of using the
Takings Clause to dismantle a program that exacts little, if any, burden on clients and provides a significant portion of the revenue for
legal aid. 9 4 This position overlooks the Taking Clause's fundamental
purpose of preventing the state from burdening a limited class of
people with the responsibility of financing government programs that
the general tax-paying public should properly support. 195
The states' violation of this constitutional tenet can be seen in
the enactment and evolution of IOLTAs. The ardor to implement
IOLTAs was based upon a belief among jurists that legal aid was in
need of increased funding. 9 6 Furthermore, recent decreases in federal
funding for legal services have prodded states to increase the revenue
generated by IOLTAs by increasing the level of attorney compulsion in
their programs. 97 In pushing for measures designed to increase
IOLTA income, program supporters have often framed the debate in
terms of whether the community is willing to meet its social obligation
to provide for the poor. 98

194. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion on the use of IOLTA revenue.
195. Jurists have long recognized the dangers that the Takings Clause was meant to
prevent. As early as 1893, the Supreme Court stated:
[The Takings Clause] prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his
just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the
public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). See also Penn
Central,438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (noting that
the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the state from "forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
Some observers have overlooked the fact that the Takings Clause only prevents the state
from inequitably distributing costs throughout society. See, for example, Texas Equal Access,
106 F.3d at 643 (Benavides, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, if clients possess a property interest
in IOLTA revenue, depository institutions in the absence of an IOLTA violate the common law
rule that interest follows principal by retaining the full amount of depositors' interest); Elliot and
Elder, Texas Lawyer at 18 (cited in note 30) (noting IOLTA supporter's improper belief that the
Texas Equal Access holding would allow "every bank customer [to] call every bank every day and
tell them what to do with the float off their account7). See note 10 for an extended discussion of
the state action requirement.
196. See Matter of Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d at 406 (noting petitioner's
desire to support "law-related charitable objects such as legal aid for the disadvantaged").
197. Worthington, 18 Stetson L. Rev. at 421 (citedin note 19).
198. See id. at 440 (stating that the implementation of a mandatory IOLTA in Florida would
"ensure that the legal profession continue its tradition of responding to the social needs of the
community...").
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These moral exhortations shroud the true nature of the IOLTA
debate, however. The real issue is not whether legal aid is a deserving
source of increased government expenditures; rather, the proper
question is who should shoulder the burden of paying for legal services
for the poor-the public at large or an isolated political minority. The
Takings Clause encourages political accountability by deterring states
from isolating funding decisions from the cost-benefit analysis that
necessarily arises out of a general government appropriations process
in which politicians must determine how to allocate limited revenue
and justify their decisions to the electorate. This accountability is lost
under IOLTAs by confining the costs of these programs to a dispersed
political minority. 199

In the instant controversy, the issue of the proper level of
funding for legal aid has plainly been subject to the rigors of the political process as the result of the public furor surrounding the decision of
the 104th Congress to target legal aid for substantial budgetary cutbacks. 200 Notwithstanding the assumption of IOLTA supporters that
an unmitigated need for increased government spending on legal
services exists, the majority of our nation's representatives voted to
decrease significantly the level of funding for legal services. 20 1

For

those people who believe that Congress erred by decreasing funding
for legal services, the constitutional solution rests in persuading the
political majority that Congress's decision was unwise, not in using
banking loopholes to impose the costs of funding their politicallyrepudiated priority on an unorganized political minority.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Texas Equal Access, the Fifth Circuit properly recognized
that state law defines property under the Constitution, and that under
state law, the owner of principal is the owner of interest generated by
that principal. In contrast, courts affirming the constitutionality of
IOLTAs have disregarded Supreme Court precedent addressing the
parameters of constitutionally-recognized property rights. The Webb's
Court rejected the argument that, because the state creates the

199. See Frances A. McMorris, Ruling May Undermine ProgramsThat Fund Legal Services
for Poor, Wall Street Journal B12 (September 30, 1996) (noting comment of lawyer challenging
constitutionality of IOLTAs that such programs "do an end-run around state legislatures").
200. See Legal Aid and Federal Funds, Washington Post A20 (July 22, 1995) (exhorting
Congress not to reduce funding for legal services).
201. Price, Investor's Business Daily at Al (cited in note 4).
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possibility of interest when none was available before, it may
recharacterize such interest as state property. Furthermore, Loretto
revealed that the existence of a constitutionally-cognizable property
right does not depend on whether the confiscated property possesses
any economic value to the claimant. Thus, no precedent exempts
IOLTAs from the common law rule that interest follows principal.
Consequently, clients possess a property interest in IOLTA revenue.
Takings jurisprudence reflects a balance between the historical
protection given to property rights and the recognition that effective
government would be imperiled if the state were held financially responsible for all decreases in the value of private property resulting
from state action.2°2 In the case of permanent physical occupations of
property, these conflicting concerns have been resolved in favor of a
per se takings rule. This categorical standard, which applies to the
confiscation of money as well as real estate and governs regardless of
the value of the invaded property, compels a finding that IOLTAs
result in an unconstitutional taking of clients' property. While jurists'
motives for implementing and expanding IOLTAs have no doubt been
sincere, the constitutional solution for increasing government funding
for legal aid lies in convincing the political majority of the need to
dedicate a greater amount of limited government resources to this
priority, rather than in quietly confiscating property from a dispersed
political minority under IOLTAs.
Kevin H. Douglas*

202. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (recognizing that
"[glovernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law").
*
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